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Models of Judicial Tenure: 




Tenure is an important facet of judicial independence and a key principle underpinning the 
rule of law, yet its protection varies markedly from country to country. This article examines 
the historical development and empirical experience of three pre-eminent appellate courts—
the Supreme Court of the United States, the High Court of Australia and the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa—as examples of prevalent models of tenure, namely, life tenure, age 
limits and term limits. Dissatisfaction with tenure arrangements in each jurisdiction has been 
impelled by increasing human longevity, growing awareness of incapacities that accompany 
ageing, and changing attitudes to age discrimination. These developments have led to 
constitutional and legislative reforms to ameliorate the problems that inhere in different 
models of tenure. However, the choice between models, and between key parameters within 
each model, reflect complex policy preferences. The article concludes that hybrid 
arrangements that incorporate age limits and term limits provide an appropriate compromise 
between competing policy objectives. 
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1. Introduction 
Judicial tenure is an important facet of judicial independence and a key principle 
underpinning the rule of law. Robust provisions for tenure allow judges the freedom to decide 
cases according to law, without fearing reprisal through demotion or dismissal, or 
anticipating favour through promotion or re-appointment, by executive government. It has 
not always been so. In Seventeenth Century England, judges were commonly transferred or 
dismissed after deciding cases in a manner that displeased the monarch who appointed them. 
Since then, systems of government have evolved to give much greater protection to judicial 
officers by enshrining principles of tenure in law and practice, although the evolutionary 
process has been uneven and some countries have a chequered history of judicial 
independence. 
Tenure is not a binary concept that either exists or not. Provisions relating to tenure can be 
crafted in diverse ways that support a greater or lesser degree of independence. This article 
examines three circumstances in which judicial office is terminated by the occurrence of a 
particular event. These events are: (a) death, (b) attaining a mandatory retirement age, and 
(c) reaching the end of a fixed term appointment, and they correspond to three models of 
tenure that are here called life limits, age limits and term limits. They are not the only 
circumstances in which judges cease to hold office. Judges may voluntarily resign by reason 
of ill health, infirmity, boredom or impecuniosity, or to pursue other positions; they may be 
nudged out of office by their peers or head of jurisdiction if their capacity to discharge the 
functions of office is in doubt; 1  or they may be removed by reason of misconduct or 
incapacity. The last process—removal—is so purposefully demanding that it is seldom 
invoked. Yet, despite its rarity, removal has attracted substantial academic commentary while 
the literature on life limits, age limits and term limits is meagre. 
This article addresses the gap by examining constitutional models of judicial tenure that 
account for a large proportion of judicial terminations. It does so by investigating three courts 
that exemplify disparate practices—the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of life 
limits; the High Court of Australia in the case of age limits; and the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in the case of term limits.2 These courts, which will be abbreviated to ‘the 
Supreme Court, ‘the High Court’ and ‘the Constitutional Court’, are pre-eminent appellate 
courts and can loosely be described as apex courts.3 
An examination of models of judicial tenure is timely because there appears to be 
dissatisfaction with historical models and growing divergence in contemporary constitutional 
practice. While the importance of judicial independence has not diminished, the social 
context in which independence is to be protected has altered, necessitating a reappraisal of 
                                                 
1 Historical examples of forced resignations in the United Kingdom are documented in R F V Heuston, 
Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940 (Clarendon Press, 1964); R F V Heuston, Lives of the Lord 
Chancellors 1940-1970 (Clarendon Press, 1987). A statutory procedure for doing so was introduced by 
the Administration of Justice Act 1973 (UK) s 12, discussed in A A Paterson, 'The Infirm Judge' (1974) 
1(1) British Journal of Law and Society 83. 
2 In the Constitutional Court of South Africa, tenure is now based on a hybrid model. See Part 3(D) below. 
3 In 2013 the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was extended to include non-constitutional matters in 
which the Court grants leave to appeal in the interests of justice: South African Constitution 1996 s 167, 
as amended by the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 2012 (South Africa). 
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available tenure options. The most conspicuous social changes have been the marked rise in 
human longevity, the corresponding exposure of incapacities associated with senescence, and 
changing attitudes towards age-based discrimination. 
A novel feature of this article is that it provides a comparative empirical assessment of the 
tenure practices of the selected courts by examining changes over time in the judges’ age at 
appointment, age at termination and length of service. There is considerable similarity in the 
mean age at appointment in the three courts but there are stark differences in the other 
variables. In recent years, justices of the Supreme Court, who enjoy life tenure, have served 
on average 10 years longer, and to much older ages, than justices of the High Court or the 
Constitutional Court. 
The courts selected for this study are paradigms that reflect a broad span of constitutional 
practice but they do not exhaust that practice. It is sometimes suggested that the tenure of 
judges should depend on an assessment of their continuing ability to perform judicial work 
to the requisite standard as they age.4 These proposals derive their force from the argument 
that individual capacity assessment or competence testing is superior to the imposition of a 
blanket rule of compulsory retirement because the latter ‘fails to account for the differing 
capacities of individuals at older ages, reinforces stereotypes about the abilities of mature age 
workers and reduces utilisation of the workforce contribution of mature age workers’.5 
Whatever the merits of capacity assessment in the general workforce, its application to judges 
is problematic because of the countervailing interest in immunising the judiciary from 
executive discretion, where such assessments might be reposed. Moreover, the ability to 
make reliable assessments of capacity in relation to the nuanced cognitive activity of judging 
is doubtful. This article does not discuss this model of tenure. 
The argument is organised as follows. Part 2 examines the changing social context in which 
judicial tenure must now be assessed. Then, commencing with the historical antecedents of 
judicial tenure under the Stuart Kings, Part 3 discusses the constitutional framework for 
regulating judicial tenure in three courts that exemplify the use of life limits, age limits and 
term limits in common law adjudication,6 where greater demands on the creativity of judges 
place a premium on their independence. Part 4 turns to the empirical record and considers 
how different models of tenure are reflected in the experience of the courts with regard to 
age at appointment, age at termination and length of service. Part 5 explores how the 
problems inherent in the constitutional models have been ameliorated by legislative 
intervention. In the United States, these interventions have sought to encourage life-tenure 
judges to exit early; in Australia they have sought to encourage mandatory retirees to return 
to the bench as acting judges; and in South Africa they have sought to encourage judges to 
stay longer in their positions. Part 6 examines the tensions that inhere in different models of 
tenure through the lens of five dyadic relationships, namely, judicial independence versus 
accountability; constancy versus change in the composition of the bench; cost versus 
                                                 
4 See David Garrow, 'Mental Decrepitude on the US Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment' (2000) 67 University of Chicago Law Review 995, 1056–65. 
5 Australian Law Reform Commission, 'Access All Ages: Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, ALRC 
Report 120' (ALRC, 2013) 98. 
6 South Africa has a hybrid legal system that incorporates elements of civil (Roman-Dutch) law, but it 
adopts a common law approach with respect to public law. 
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effectiveness; rigidity versus flexibility in the level of regulation; and the contrast between 
courts at different levels of the hierarchy or invested with different subject matter jurisdiction. 
Part 7 concludes that the choice between models, and between key parameters within each 
model, reflect complex policy preferences. Hybrid arrangements that incorporate age limits 
and term limits—illustrated by the experience of the Constitutional Court of South Africa—
provide an appropriate compromise between competing policy objectives. 
2. Changing Social Facts 
The plurality of constitutional practice with respect to judicial tenure reflects the growing 
complexity of the social environment in which legal policy is formulated. While the 
relevance of judicial independence has not diminished, the social facts against which that 
principle operates have changed. Three changes merit attention—the marked rise in human 
longevity; the corresponding exposure of incapacities associated with senescence; and 
changing attitudes towards age-based discrimination. 
A. Increasing Longevity 
The developed world has experienced dramatic improvements in human longevity since the 
Industrial Revolution. In 1701, when life tenure for judges was first adopted in England as a 
matter of regular constitutional practice, life expectancy was only 37 years, and this barely 
changed over the next 150 years.7 Today the life expectancy at birth for both sexes combined 
is around 79 years in the United States and 82 years in Australia, and by 2100 this is projected 
to rise to 89 years and 93 years, respectively, adding a whole decade to the average life span. 
South Africa has not fared as well due in part to the HIV/AIDS epidemic,8 but life expectancy 
is still expected to improve from the current level of 57 years to 78 years by the end of the 
century.9 These gains are attributable to better hygiene, sanitation, medical practice and 
pharmacology, and are part of an epidemiological transition in which humans have 
progressed in stages from an ‘age of pestilence and famine’ to an ‘age of degenerative and 
man-made diseases’.10 
For the present study, a more significant statistic is life expectancy at the average age of 
judicial appointment, which is around 50 years of age, depending on the court. In 2005–2010, 
a judge appointed at age 50 could expect a total life span of 81.1 years in the United States, 
83.6 years in Australia and 70.8 years in South Africa.11 These figures exceed life expectancy 
at birth because a person who reaches the age of judicial appointment has already survived 
                                                 
7 Edward Wrigley and Roger Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871: A Reconstruction 
(Cambridge University Press, 1981) 230. 
8 Hoosen Coovadia et al, 'The Health and Health System of South Africa: Historical Roots of Current Public 
Health Challenges' (2009) 374 Lancet 817. 
9 United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm>. 
10 Abdel Omran, 'The Epidemiological Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change' 
(1971) 49 Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 509. 
11 United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Abridged Life 
Table for both Sexes Combined, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2012/MORT/F17-1 UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm>. 
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the vicissitudes of life for many decades, including the first year of life, which is the most 
perilous. Examined from another perspective, a large proportion of the ongoing 
improvements in life expectancy comes from reductions in the mortality of males and females 
in their senior years. 12  This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the percentage 
improvement in life expectancy at different ages in Australia and the United States over the 
period 1933–2009 (for which data are readily available). The graph demonstrates that life 
expectancy has improved in both countries for all ages (except the extremely old in the United 
States), but the largest improvements have come from those aged 50–90 in the United States 
and those aged 50–100 in Australia. In general, the improvements have been greater for 
females than males, and better for Australians than for United States residents. 
Figure 1: Percentage Improvements in Life Expectancy by Age, Sex and Country, 1933–2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and 
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or 
www.humanmortality.de. 
 
There are many instances of judges serving well into old age, leading judge Richard Posner 
to the colourful observation that the United States judiciary is ‘the nation’s premier geriatric 
occupation’.13 For example, in the United States Federal District Court, Judge Wesley Brown 
died in office in 2012 at age 104, having served nearly 50 years on the bench, making him 
both the longest serving and oldest federal judge still hearing cases at that date. A list of the 
longest serving federal judges records 191 individuals who have served more than 40 years 
                                                 
12 Heather Booth, 'The Changing Dimensions of Mortality' in Siew-Ean Khoo and Peter McDonald (eds), 
The Transformation of Australia's Population 1970-2030 (UNSW Press, 2003) 104, 114–16. 
13 Richard Posner, Aging and Old Age (University of Chicago Press, 1995) 180. 
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on the bench since 1789.14 In Australia too there are examples of judges serving well into 
their eighties—records that were set in the era, now passed, in which appointment was for 
life.15 
The fact of declining mortality has the potential to impact all models of judicial tenure—
judges appointed for life have the potential to serve substantially longer terms; judges 
appointed to a fixed age are likely to have longer periods in retirement; and judges appointed 
for fixed terms are likely to have longer periods of their productive working lives in non-
judicial roles. 
B. Productivity and Decrepitude 
One of the sequelae of increased life expectancy is that the frailties of human ageing are 
exposed to public view in circumstances that were often masked when life was ‘brutish and 
short’.16 One frailty is that productivity in working life generally declines with advanced 
age—especially when problem solving, learning and speed are required job attributes.17 
According to the life-cycle model of human capital accumulation, productivity initially 
increases during a learning phase, then peaks, and finally falls as investment in skills declines 
in older ages.18 It has been suggested that judges are an exception to this pattern and that they 
perform ‘creditably and indeed sometimes with great distinction at advanced ages’. 19 
Moreover, age-related declines in productivity can be ameliorated in appellate courts by the 
collegiate behaviour of judges, such as sharing the burden of producing written reasons 
through joint judgments. 20  Yet empirical studies of superior courts support a life-cycle 
hypothesis in which judges exert less influence as they get older. Measured by the number 
of times a judge’s decisions are cited in later cases (which has been taken as a proxy for the 
quality of judicial output), the productivity of High Court and Federal Court judges in 
Australia has been shown to peak when judges are in their sixties and then decline with age 
until retirement.21  
                                                 
14 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_federal_judges_by_longevity_of_service 
(accessed 3 September 2014). The tally includes both active and senior service: see Part 5(A) below. 
15 Keith Mason, Lawyers Then and Now: An Australian Legal Miscellany (Federation Press, 2012) 86–8. 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin Classics, 1651 [1985]) Ch XIII, 186. 
17 Vegard Skirbekk, 'Age and Individual Productivity: A Literature Survey' (2004) 2 Vienna Yearbook of 
Population Research 133. 
18 Arthur Diamond, 'The Life-Cycle Research Productivity of Mathematicians and Scientists' (1986) 41(4) 
Journal of Gerontology 520. 
19 Posner, above n 13, 181. 
20 There is a large political science literature on joint, concurring and dissenting opinions in the United States 
Supreme Court: see eg Harold Spaeth, 'Consensus in the Unanimous Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court' 
(1989) 72(5) Judicature 274; Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme Court Decision-
Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (University of Chicago Press, 1999). In Australia: Matthew 
Groves and Russell Smyth, 'A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on the 
High Court 1903-2001' (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 255. Any pressure towards joint judgments is 
driven less by the need for productivity gains than by the desire to build institutional legitimacy and 
cohesiveness. 
21 Mita Bhattacharya and Russell Smyth, 'Aging and Productivity Among Judges: Some Empirical Evidence 
from the High Court of Australia' (2001) 40(2) Australian Economic Papers 199; Russell Smyth and Mita 
Bhattacharya, 'How Fast Do Old Judges Slow Down? A Life Cycle Study of Aging and Productivity in 
the Federal Court of Australia' (2003) 23 International Review of Law and Economics 141. 
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A more serious problem is that an ageing bench may not only be less productive but may 
become susceptible to incapacitation through senescence. In a pioneering study of ‘mental 
decrepitude’ on the United States Supreme Court, David Garrow concluded that ‘historical 
evidence convincingly demonstrates that mental decrepitude among aging justices is a 
persistently recurring problem that merits serious attention’.22 Noting that the Twentieth 
Century featured 11 Supreme Court justices whose declining mental capacity should have 
led to earlier departure, Garrow advocated a constitutional amendment to impose mandatory 
retirement for justices at age 75. Without that barrier, judges might continue to adjudicate 
into old age because, as Posner has remarked, ‘judging is light work [and] senility is virtually 
the only condition short of death that disables a judge from performing at a satisfactory 
although not necessarily distinguished level’.23 
Garrow’s account is unusual for its depth of treatment of a sensitive subject that is largely 
unrecorded. Documentation of judicial infirmity is often confined to examples in judicial 
biographies and snippets in legal miscellanea. As with all inductive reasoning, it is not 
possible to derive definitive generalisations from these particularised accounts, yet anecdotes 
abound. One well-documented example concerns Australia’s youngest appointee to the High 
Court, H V Evatt, who left that office in 1930 at the age of 46 to pursue a career in national 
politics. Twenty years later, when he was ‘far removed from the practice of law and already 
showing signs of mental deterioration’, he was made Chief Justice of New South Wales.24 
However, he was unable to function at the most basic level—he was unfocussed, had no 
grasp of the cases at hand, and relied on others to write his judgments. Ultimately, he was 
encouraged to resign and spent his remaining years in a ‘regressed state under the care of his 
wife and a nurse’.25 
The manner in which age affects productivity and decrepitude has a bearing on the merits of 
life limits and age limits as models of judicial tenure. The prospect of mental incapacity raises 
concerns about life tenure and provides a yardstick for determining an appropriate retirement 
age if mandatory retirement is adopted. 
C. Age Discrimination 
The third social change is the shift in public attitudes towards ageing and age-based 
discrimination. Term limits are an age-neutral model of tenure because the duration of a 
judge’s appointment is unrelated to his or her chronological age. Life tenure is a pro-ageing 
model of tenure because it implicitly assumes judges have full capacity to discharge their 
functions until their death or earlier voluntary retirement, even if this entails service into 
extreme old age. By contrast, age limits embody an ageist conception of tenure because 
judges cease to hold office on reaching the mandatory retirement age regardless of their 
individual capacities. The presumption of ‘statutory senility’, as mandatory retirement is 
sometimes called, is the price paid for avoiding the risk of judicial over-stayers.26 As a House 
                                                 
22 Garrow, above n 4, 995. 
23 Posner, above n 13, 352. 
24 Mason, above n 15, 63. 
25 Andrew Campbell, 'Dr H V Evatt - Part One: A Question of Sanity' (2007) 73 National Observer 25, 39. 
26 See Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Belknap Press, 2003) 108–30, on the 
similar question of mandatory retirement for pilots at age 60. 
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of Lords Select Committee noted in 2012, ‘A set retirement age is undoubtedly a blunt tool 
by which to assess whether someone is no longer fully capable of performing their job.’27 It 
is this model of tenure that most significantly challenges societal views of age discrimination. 
How have legal attitudes towards ageing workers changed over recent decades? Despite the 
burgeoning of human rights norms of equality and non-discrimination in the United Nations 
era, discrimination on the basis of age has been comparatively underdeveloped at the 
international level. The reasons are not hard to fathom. The arguments for strict scrutiny of 
discrimination on the grounds of age are less compelling than for grounds such as race or sex 
because nearly everyone experiences the cycle of youth and ageing, with its concomitant 
stereotypes. 
While concern for individual rights may not have been the driving force behind the 
prohibition of age discrimination, countries have responded to anxieties about their macro 
economies. Many countries now recognise that their populations are ageing inexorably due 
to declining fertility and increasing longevity. As the proportion of the older population 
continues to rise, many economies will face declining labour force participation rates and 
reduced growth unless they can retain the skills of older workers. 28  There is a broad 
consensus that ‘policies that remove barriers to employment and enhance the productivity of 
older men and women are an essential part of any effective response to population aging’.29 
These concerns underpin the legislative prohibition of age discrimination in employment in 
the United States, Australia and South Africa (where there is also constitutional protection). 
The upshot is that mandatory retirement has been all but abolished for most public and private 
employees. 
Should judges be subject to mandatory retirement laws that do not apply to the public at large? 
At the macro level, judges form a minute segment of the economy and their exclusion from 
a general prohibition on mandatory retirement is of little economic consequence. A more 
compelling argument is that judges as individual are the bearers of rights and are entitled to 
be free from age discrimination. Yet this right is not absolute, as is recognised in the 
exemption of some occupational classifications from general statutory protections.30 It must 
thus be asked whether the state’s interest in ensuring the proper administration of justice 
through the retention of only the most able judges justifies a mandatory retirement rule whose 
application may be over-broad in particular instances. 
                                                 
27 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 'Judicial Appointments' (House of Lords, 2012), 
59. 
28 Australian Productivity Commission, 'Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia' (Productivity 
Commission, 2005). 
29 Andrew Mason and Ronald Lee, 'Population Aging and the Generational Economy: Key Findings' in 
Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason (eds), Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global 
Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2011) 3, 27. 
30 In the United States, firefighters and law enforcement officers are exempted from the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 USC §§ 621-634 (1967) §623(j). 
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3. Four Models of Judicial Tenure 
Constitutional history reveals four core models of judicial tenure in Britain and its erstwhile 
dominions. The earliest was the model in which judges held office at the discretion of the 
executive and could be dismissed at whim. This discretionary model is the antithesis of 
judicial independence and bears the institutional risks of bias in decision-making, erosion of 
public confidence in the judiciary, and (for non-compliant judges) a tenuous grasp on office. 
When the worst excesses of the Stuart Kings generated pressure for reform at the end of the 
Seventeenth Century, the discretionary model gave way to the regular practice of appointing 
judges for life. This model has endured in many countries whose constitutional systems 
evolved from the United Kingdom. Life tenure provides a very high degree of independence 
because a judge is largely placed beyond the reach of the executive’s opprobrium from the 
moment of appointment. However, some of the difficulties that are inherent this model were 
masked by the short life expectancy of appointees in those times. A life tenure judge who is 
disinclined to retire may hold office into extreme old age and this too may adversely affect 
public confidence in the judiciary if the judge lacks capacity to decide cases according to law. 
In the Twentieth Century and beyond, modern democracies experimented with other models 
of tenure, including mandatory retirement at a specified age and appointment for a fixed term. 
A. The Whimsy of the Stuart Kings: Executive Discretion 
England was a turbulent place in the Seventeenth Century—riven by war with other nations, 
clashes between the monarch and Parliament, and theological conflict between Catholicism 
and Anglicanism. In the legal world, this heady mix gave rise to a transformation in 
constitutional practice from judges holding office during the King’s pleasure (quam diu nobis 
placuerit) to judges holding office during good behaviour (quam diu se bene gesserit), but 
the transition was neither rapid nor smooth.31 
Before 1641 the letters patent issued by a monarch when conferring judicial office nearly 
always stated that the office was held during the King’s pleasure. This allowed a judge to be 
dismissed at will, without cause. In practice this arrangement caused little difficulty because 
the King and the Parliament worked together harmoniously. It was not until the courts were 
implicated in the struggle for power between the executive and the legislature that their 
independence became important. 32  There followed an unsettled period in which the 
predilections of the monarch resulted in some judges being appointed during pleasure and 
others during good behaviour. The worst excesses of monarchical power occurred under the 
Stuart Kings,33 whose transfer and removal of troublesome judges made some ‘pretty black 
pages of history’.34 In the last 11 years of his reign, Charles II dismissed 11 of his judges; 
                                                 
31 See C H McIlwain, 'The Tenure of English Judges' (1913) 7(2) American Political Science Review 217; 
Naamani Tarkow, 'The Significance of the Act of Settlement in the Evolution of English Democracy' 
(1943) 58(4) Political Science Quarterly 537; Sir Henry Brooke, 'Judicial Independence: Its History in 
England and Wales' in Helen Cunningham (ed), Fragile Bastion: Judicial Independence in the Nineties 
and Beyond (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 1997) 89. 
32 Shimon Shetreet and Sophie Turenne, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the 
English Judiciary (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 21. 
33 James I (1603–1625), Charles I (1625–1649), Charles II (1660–1685) and James II (1685–1688). 
34 McIlwain, above n 31, 222. 
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while his brother James II dismissed 13 judges in four years, including four in one day.35 A 
particular source of conflict was James II’s plan to re-Catholicise the country by appointing 
Catholics to important public positions. When the judges declined to support the King’s 
attempt to dispense with laws that barred Catholics from holding public office, the judges 
were summarily dismissed.36 
The discretionary model of judicial tenure did not long survive the Glorious Revolution. 
Dissatisfaction with the capricious actions of the King eventually led Parliament to limit the 
royal prerogative through the Act of Settlement 1701. Its critical contribution to bolstering 
judicial independence was a provision stating that ‘Judges Commissions be made quam diu 
se bene gesserint [during good behaviour] and their salaries ascertained and established but 
upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them.’37 
The enactment created two channels by which a judge’s tenure might be brought to an end: 
first, where a judge ceased to be of good behaviour and thus failed to fulfil the conditions of 
the letters patent; and second upon a joint address of the Houses of Parliament without any 
cause shown. Removal on the former ground was a matter for the Crown but it was a 
substantial advance on holding office at pleasure because it involved the safeguard of 
proceedings before a court (on a writ of scire facias) in which the judge could show cause 
why the letters patent should not be revoked. Removal on the latter ground, although 
permitted for any reason, established an elaborate procedure that Parliament was reluctant to 
invoke. Since 1701 this procedure has been used only once in the United Kingdom—in 1830 
to remove an Irish judge who had been found guilty of embezzlement38—leading one writer 
to suggest that there may now be a convention against invoking the address procedure except 
in the most flagrant or extreme cases of judicial incapacity.39 
B. Til Death Us Do Part: Life Tenure in the United States 
Life tenure became the standard practice for judicial appointments in England after the Act 
of Settlement, and a model for other legal systems that looked to English constitutional history 
for guidance. Although that model has not endured in the United Kingdom itself—where 
judges appointed to higher courts since 1959 have been required to retire at age 75, and those 
appointed since 1995 at age 7040—the influence of the Act of Settlement on the common law 
world cannot be gainsaid. Thus it was that Art III s 1 of the United States Constitution 
provided that federal judges ‘shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour’, while Art II 
s 4 made provision for judges to be removed from office by impeachment for ‘Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors’. 
                                                 
35 Brooke, above n 31, 97; McIlwain, above n 31, 223–4. 
36 Robert Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2002) 1–
7. 
37 Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will III , c 2. 
38 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2007) 119. 
39 Paterson, above n 1, 83. 
40 Judicial Pensions Act 1959 (UK) s 2; Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (UK) s 26. See also 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, above n 27, 58. 
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Writing in support of Art III s 1 during the ratification period, Alexander Hamilton advanced 
several reasons for preferring life tenure over ‘temporary commissions’.41 Permanency in 
office not only comported with the best practice of state constitutions of the day and the 
‘illustrious’ experience of Great Britain but contributed so much to ‘that independent spirit 
in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty’. 
Hamilton was particularly ardent in his criticism of age limits for federal judges. Rejecting 
the approach in the New York Constitution of taking a particular age (60 years) as the 
‘criterion of inability’, he argued that a judge’s ‘deliberating faculties’ preserved their 
strength well beyond that age, and that very few men outlived ‘the season of intellectual 
vigor’.42 
The life tenure model that was adopted for federal judges, and continues to this day, is no 
longer widely embraced at the state level, where 32 of 50 states now have mandatory 
retirement ages entrenched in their constitutions or legislation for at least some state judges,43 
often overlaid by a pastiche of mechanisms for selection or retention through popular 
election.44 The constitutionality of mandatory retirement laws has been challenged under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that they are 
discriminatory, but the Supreme Court has consistently upheld them.45 
C. Constitutional Senility: Age Limits in Australia 
The third model of tenure is one in which judicial office expires when the judge attains a 
specified age. Age limits have a substantial pedigree and are used in many countries at all 
levels of the judicial hierarchy. This section examines their adoption in the Australian 
Constitution, which regulates the federal judiciary, and compares this with the practice in the 
constituent states of the federation. 
The Australian Constitution was modelled closely on the United States Constitution. Yet, in 
respect of judicial tenure, differences emerged with successive drafts as the Australian 
founders sought to strengthen judicial independence by circumscribing the situations in 
which a judge could be removed from office. The key provision is s 72, which, as enacted, 
contemplated only one mode of termination. It provided, and still provides, that federal 
judges ‘shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from 
both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground 
of proved misbehaviour or incapacity’. 
However, s 72 failed to specify the tenure of federal judges—it made no express mention of 
holding office during good behaviour but only provided for removal. This uncertainty was 
                                                 
41 Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist No. 78' in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison (eds), 
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (Modern Library: Random House, 
1788) 502. 
42 Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist No. 79' in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison (eds), 
The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States (Modern Library: Random House, 
1788) 512. 
43 Ashby Jones, 'A New Lease for Old Judges', Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 March 2013. 
44 Meryl Chertoff, 'Trends in Judicial Selection in the States' (2010) 42 McGeorge Law Review 47, 50, 63. 
45 Gregory v Ashcroft 501 US 452 (1991) 472. See also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia 427 
US 307 (1976); Vance v Bradley 440 US 93 (1979); Kimel v Florida Board of Regents 528 US 62 (2000). 
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not resolved for many years. In Alexander’s Case46 the High Court considered the validity of 
the appointment of the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. 
The Court was established in 1904 as a new federal court to hear and determine industrial 
disputes, but its President was appointed only ‘during good behaviour for seven years’, with 
the possibility of reappointment.  A majority of the High Court held that the appointment was 
invalid because, under s 72, every judge of a court created by the Parliament is required to 
be appointed for life, subject only to the power of removal on the grounds of ‘proved 
misbehaviour or incapacity’. For Isaacs and Rich JJ, it was ‘plain that the independence of 
the tribunal would be seriously weakened if the Commonwealth Parliament could fix any 
less permanent tenure than for life’—a claim that might now be challenged in light of the 
experience of other courts with age limits and term limits. 
The original text of s 72 remained the basis of judicial tenure for federal judges for the next 
60 years, notwithstanding major reviews of the Constitution in 1929 and 1959. However, in 
1977 a Senate Committee conducted an inquiry into the tenure of federal judges,47 prompted 
by parliamentarians who were shocked at being sworn into office by an aged and feeble 
Acting Chief Justice. 48  The Committee’s recommendations became the basis of a 
constitutional referendum to introduce a mandatory retirement age for federal judges. For 
justices of the High Court this was to be 70 years of age; for judges of other federal courts, 
70 years was to be the maximum age but Parliament could set a lower limit if it chose to do 
so. Faced with bipartisan support for the referendum proposal, voters gave it their 
overwhelming endorsement: the referendum passed in all states and was approved by over 
80 per cent of the population. 
The Government’s rationale for proposing the constitutional amendment can be seen in the 
second reading speech made in Parliament when introducing the relevant Bill.49  In the 
opinion of the Attorney-General there was an almost universal practice that holders of public 
office retire on attaining a maximum retirement age.50 He noted that a fixed retirement age 
had been adopted in all state Supreme Courts and that it was appropriate to make similar 
provision for the growing number of federal judges. The issue became a live one from the 
mid-1970s as the Australian Parliament began to create new federal courts, invest them with 
jurisdiction, and appoint judges to hear and determine the new matters.51 Perhaps more 
revealing are the comments made during the parliamentary debate, namely, that judges are 
not immune from the geriatric processes of mental decay, and that the proposed age limit 
would lead to a younger body of judges who are ‘closer to the people’ and have ‘current day 
sets of values’.52 These views echo the efforts of the Lord Chancellor to modernise the 
                                                 
46 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434. 
47 Australian Parliament, 'Report on Retiring Age for Commonwealth Judges, Parliamentary Paper No. 
414/1976' (Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, 1977). 
48 Michael Kirby, 'Sir Edward McTiernan: A Centenary Reflection' (1991) 20 Federal Law Review 165, 181. 
49 Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) Bill 1977 (Cth). 
50 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 February 1977, 147 (Mr Ellicott, 
Attorney-General). 
51 Brian Opeskin, 'The State of the Judicature: A Statistical Profile of Australian Courts and Judges' (2013) 
35 Sydney Law Review 489, 499–503. 
52 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 17 February 1977, 203 (Mr Sinclair), 
206 (Mr Bowen), 209 (Mr Hodgman), 220 (Mr Neil). 
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English judicial system in the 1950s, including by introducing mandatory retirement, when 
it was said that judges had until then been allowed to continue ‘in a job which requires the 
keenest faculties at an age when other men are deemed suitable only for some gentle 
gardening’.53 
The notion that there should be a mandatory retirement age for federal judges appears to have 
been quickly accepted but there was virtually no discussion of the appropriateness of 
selecting 70 years as the maximum age. For example, it passed unremarked that the United 
Kingdom had set a retirement age of 75 years for judges of higher courts nearly 20 years 
before.54 Even the report of the Senate Committee said little on the subject, noting only that 
70 was the ‘retiring age most commonly established for judges of State and territory Supreme 
Courts’.55 The desire for conformity between state and federal practice was conspicuous. 
New South Wales was the first state in Australia—and one of the first jurisdictions in the 
British Empire—to introduce a mandatory retirement age for judges of superior courts when 
it legislated during the First World War.56 The law was the ‘product of a unique time’ in 
which there were persistent ‘unfriendly relations between the government and the 
judiciary’.57 A significant motivation for the change appears to have been the desire to 
terminate the office of specific judges. The retirement age was set at 70 years with a passing 
reference to the biblical lifespan of ‘three score and ten years’. 58  The choice proved 
influential and other states followed with constitutional or statutory amendments. Today, 
70 years remains the mandatory retirement age for judicial officers in all states except in New 
South Wales and Tasmania, where it has since been increased to 72 years, 59  and in 
magistrates’ courts in Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, where it is 65 
years.60 
D. Term Limits in South Africa 
A fourth model of tenure is one in which a judge’s term has a fixed duration and thus comes 
to an end by effluxion of time. This mode of termination is used in a large number of countries. 
It is especially prevalent in constitutional courts that follow the civil law tradition where 
constitutional review is concentrated in a specialised court to the exclusion of other courts, 
in contrast to the common law tradition where constitutional review is diffused throughout 
the courts of the land. The progenitor of the specialised model was the Austrian 
Constitutional Court established in 1920,61 but specialisation became a typical feature of 
constitutional review in Continental Europe after the Second World War and proliferated 
                                                 
53 Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts : A Sociological Study of the English Legal 
System 1750-1965 (Heinemann, 1967), 268 (quoting from The Economist). 
54 Judicial Pensions Act 1959 (UK) s 2. 
55 Australian Parliament, above n 47, [50]. 
56 Judges Retirement Act 1918 (NSW) s 3. 
57 Tony Cunneen, 'A Creature of a Momentary Panic' (2010) Winter Bar News 74, 83. 
58 ibid, 77. 
59 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 44(1); Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 6A. 
60 Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) sch 1, cl 11(1)(a); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 7D. 
61 Theo Öhlinger, 'The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation' (2003) 16(2) 
Ratio Juris 206. 
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further with the collapse of communism.62 However, the term limit varies widely, from 
6 years in Niger and Portugal to 12 years in Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey.63 
This section focusses on the evolution of term limits in the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa, where a new court was established to adjudicate sensitive constitutional questions in 
the post-apartheid era, free from the taint of complicity in a ‘wicked system’ that infected the 
judiciary in the apartheid years.64 Its utility as a case study is not dependent on the specialised 
nature of constitutional review, which was difficult to maintain from its inception65 and has 
now been formally abandoned,66 but rests on its practical illustration of one particular model 
of judicial tenure. In South Africa, that model applies only to justices of the Constitutional 
Court (see Part 6(E) below). 
South Africa’s 1993 interim Constitution established a Constitutional Court comprising a 
President and ten other members, and invested it with jurisdiction over all matters relating to 
the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the Constitution. The members of the Court 
were to hold office for a non-renewable period of seven years, which would take their service 
beyond the life of the interim Constitution and the first Parliament.67 For those involved in 
negotiating the interim Constitution, the limited terms were thought appropriate for judges 
of the top court, which was to exercise substantial political authority through its constitutional 
mandate. 68  In 1994, a President and ten other judges were duly appointed to the 
Constitutional Court. To provide balance between continuity and change,69 four judges had 
to be appointed from the ranks of existing judges, and this remains a requirement today.70  
Important changes were made to tenure arrangements by the adoption of the final 
Constitution in 1996. Under s 176(1), a Constitutional Court judge was to be appointed ‘for 
a non-renewable term of 12 years, but must retire at the age of 70’. The two new features—
longer fixed terms coupled with mandatory retirement at age 70—were modelled on 
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court whose judges hold office for 12 years, without the 
possibility of re-election, but subject to mandatory retirement at age 68.71 Reflecting on the 
rationale for term limits, Kate O’Regan, a judge of the South African Constitutional Court 
from 1994 to 2009, remarked that ‘It is unfortunate if a senior court turns over in membership 
                                                 
62 Lech Garlicki, 'Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts' (2007) 5(1) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 44, 45. 
63 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2094.html> (accessed 3 September 2014). 
64 David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: Pathologies of Legality (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2010). 
65 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [1998] ZACC 
17 (14 October 1998), [111]. 
66 See Hugh Corder and Jason Brickhill, 'The Constitutional Court' in Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier (eds), 
The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta, 2014) 355. 
67 South African Constitution 1993 ss 97(2), 99(1). 
68 Hugh Corder, 'Judicial Accountability' in Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier (eds), The Judiciary in South 
Africa (Juta, 2014) 200, 210. 
69 Heinz Klug, The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2010) 232. 
70 South African Constitution 1993 s 99(3); South African Constitution 1996 s 174(5). 
71 Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz - BVerfGG) (Germany) art 4. 
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too quickly, but it is doubly unfortunate if it turns over too slowly. Our (effective) 12-year 
term limit steers a course between these evils.’72 This issue is reprised in Part 6(B). 
The tinkering with the tenure arrangements did not end with the passage of the 1996 
Constitution. In 2001, s 176(1) of the Constitution was amended to give a new role to the 
legislature.73 The subsection now reads: ‘A Constitutional Court judge holds office for a non-
renewable term of 12 years, or until he or she attains the age of 70, whichever occurs first, 
except where an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge.’ 
The change effected by the final clause is the addition of a legislative power to extend judges’ 
terms by relaxing either the 12-year term limit or the 70-year age limit, or both. 
Parliament wasted no time in exercising its new power. In 2001 it altered both the term limit 
and the age limit, albeit in complex ways.74 The 2001 Act affirms the 12 year term limit and 
70 year age limit as alternative criteria for departure from the Court, but there are 
circumstances in which a judge may be required to serve on the Constitutional Court for 
15 years or to age 75. For example, under s 4(1), if a judge’s 12 year term on the 
Constitutional Court expires before he or she has completed a total of 15 years’ active judicial 
service (as would occur if the appointee had not previously held judicial office, or had 
previously served on another court for less than three years), then the judge must continue to 
serve on the Constitutional Court until completing 15 years’ service. Similarly, under s 4(2), 
if a judge attains age 70 before he or she has completed a total of 15 years’ active judicial 
service (as would occur if the judge were older than 55 years at appointment), then the judge 
must continue to serve on the Court until completing 15 years’ service or attaining age 75, 
whichever comes first. These statutory provisions have to conform to the constitutional right 
to equality and to the prohibition against unfair discrimination on the ground of age,75 but to 
date the courts have not considered the constitutionality of mandatory judicial retirement. 
4. The Empirical Record 
The optimal design of constitutional provisions and cognate legislation regarding judicial 
tenure requires a clear understanding of how the contrasting models operate in practice. 
Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to empirical evidence outside the United States, 
leaving many key questions unanswered. This Part seeks to fill that gap by examining 
available data on each of the three chosen courts. 
The information needed for the analysis is straightforward: for each judge appointed to a 
court over a specified period one needs only their dates of birth, appointment and termination, 
from which one can deduce three key variables: age at appointment, age at termination and 
                                                 
72 Kate O'Regan, 'The Constitutional Court: A Judge's Perspective' in Cora Hoexter and Morné Olivier (eds), 
The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta, 2014) 403, 412. 
73 Constitution Sixth Amendment Act 2001 (South Africa). 
74 Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 2001 (South Africa) ss 3, 4. 
75 South African Constitution 1996 s 9(1), (3). 
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length of service at termination. Although the data required for the analysis are undemanding, 
they are surprisingly difficult to procure.76 
A. Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–2013 
In 2006, Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren undertook a path-breaking empirical study of 
tenure on the Supreme Court.77 They found that there have been significant changes in the 
practical meaning of life tenure for justices of that Court, as evidenced in their length of 
service, age at termination, and the interval between vacancies. Comparing the 30 year period 
1941–1970 with 1971–2006, the authors found that the justices’ mean length of service had 
more than doubled to 26.1 years compared with 12.2 years in the earlier period; the mean age 
at which justices left office had risen to 78.7 years compared with 67.6 years; and the 
frequency of vacancies had declined from an average of one every 1.6 years to one every 
3.1 years. 
They proffered several reasons for the observed changes—increasing longevity; an increase 
in the strategic timing of departures by justices to ensure their replacements were appointed 
by Presidents of the appropriate political persuasion; improvements in the social status of 
judges; and a lessening of the demands of the job due to reduced caseload and more staff. In 
their view, there were three vices in the emerging patterns of tenure. They reduced 
democratic control over the Supreme Court by making appointments infrequent and irregular, 
thus limiting ‘the democratic instillation of public values on the Court through the selection 
of new judges’.78 They made the Senate confirmation process more political, to the point of 
dysfunction, because the irregular occurrence of vacancies made the stakes so high. And they 
resulted in an increasing prevalence of mental decrepitude on the Court as justices stayed for 
longer periods and to more advanced ages. The authors considered these trends to be 
sufficiently serious to warrant a constitutional amendment to abandon life tenure in favour 
of term limits.79 
For the purpose of comparative analysis, this article applies Calabresi and Lindgren’s 
methodology to data on the Supreme Court, but it updates the analysis to 30 June 2013 and 
incorporates more detailed data on age at appointment. This study also adopts an improved 
graphical representation based on a true temporal scale, which is necessary if comparisons 
are to be made between ages of appointment and termination, and between jurisdictions.80 
                                                 
76 The key data sources include: United States—Lee Epstein et al, The U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database 
(2 March 2013) <http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html>; Australia— Michael Coper, Tony 
Blackshield and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford 
University Press, 2001); ConnectWeb, Who’s Who in Australia (Crown Content, 2013); High Court of 
Australia <www.hcourt.gov.au/>; South Africa—Constitutional Court of South Africa 
<www.constitutionalcourt.org.za>; Rapule Tabane and Barbara Ludman (eds), The Mail & Guardian A-
Z of South African Politics (Jacana Media, 2009). 
77 Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren, 'Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered' 
(2006) 29(3) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 769. 
78 ibid, 811. 
79 For an opposing view favouring the retention of life tenure, see Mary Clark, 'Judicial Retirement and 
Return to Practice' (2011) 60 Catholic University Law Review 841. 
80 Compare Calabresi and Lindgren, above n 77, 780. 
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Since the Supreme Court was established in 1789, 112 justices have been appointed to it (as 
at 30 June 2013), of whom nine are incumbent and the remaining 103 have ceased to hold 
office. The average age of appointees is 52.5 years, with the youngest being appointed at 
32 years and the oldest at 65 years. Figure 2 plots the mean age at appointment, calculated as 
a moving average of the past nine appointments, commencing in 1796 when the Court 
experienced its ninth appointment. The mean age of appointment was relatively low in the 
early Nineteenth Century, but this had stabilised by the Twentieth Century to the range of 
54–56 years, and in the past 20 years to the range of 51–53 years. 
Figure 2 also plots the mean age at termination (left hand axis) and the mean length of service 
(right hand axis) of the 103 associate justices and chief justices whose appointments have 
now terminated. The means are calculated as a moving average of the past nine terminations, 
commencing in 1806 when the Court experienced its ninth termination. The graph shows that 
the mean age at termination rose markedly from around 54 years in the Supreme Court’s 
early years, to 76 years in the 1940s, before falling dramatically in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Since then there has been an unprecedented rise in the mean age at termination to its current 
historic high of 80.1 years. Given the relative stability in the mean age of appointment, not 
surprisingly the trend in age at termination is echoed in the mean length of service, which in 
2013 was also at an historic high of 28.8 years. Over the entire history of the Supreme Court, 
the mean age at termination is 69.6 years and the mean length of service is 17.0 years 
(excluding current members). 
Figure 2: Appointment, termination and length of service, US Supreme Court 
 
Source: Lee Epstein et al, The U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database (2 March 2013) 
<http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html>. 
B. High Court of Australia, 1903–2013 
Since the High Court was established in 1903, 50 justices have been appointed to the Court 
(as at 30 June 2013), of whom seven are incumbent and the remaining 43 have ceased to hold 
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office. We again examine age at appointment, age at termination and length of service using 
the methodology applied to the Supreme Court.81 The mean age of appointees is 54.1 years, 
with the youngest being appointed at 36.6 years and the oldest at 61.8 years. Figure 3 shows 
a significant drop in the mean age of appointment around 1930, when the two youngest 
appointees in the Court’s history took office in quick succession (Evatt J was 36, and 
McTiernan J was 38). The impact of these atypical appointments lessened over time, and a 
period of stability followed in the 1960s to 1980s. Since 1995 there has been a rise in the 
mean age at appointment from 51.4 years to 58.3 years, reflecting the recent tendency to 
appoint individuals who have had substantial judicial experience on other courts, and who 
are necessarily older when appointed to the High Court. 
Figure 3 also plots the mean age at termination (left hand axis) and the mean length of service 
(right hand axis) of the 43 justices whose commissions have now terminated. The graph 
shows that until the 1970s the mean age at termination was persistently above 70 years, 
despite the fact that life expectancy was much lower in the first half of the Twentieth Century. 
Once the age limit of 70 was introduced in 1977 (indicated by the dashed vertical line), the 
mean age at termination began to fall before recovering in recent years to 68.6 years. There 
is a clear visual correlation between this series and the mean length of service, which was 
persistently above 15 years until the 1970s (peaking in the 1960s at 22.9 years), but has fallen 
to 13.3 years for the last seven terminations. Over the entire history of the High Court, the 
mean age at termination is 69.4 years and the mean length of service is 15.9 years (excluding 
current members). 
                                                 
81 The means are calculated as a moving average of the past seven appointments or terminations, 
commencing when the seventh event first occurred (1913 for appointments; 1930 for terminations). The 
means are based on seven observations (rather than nine for the Supreme Court) because that is the current 
size of the Court. 
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Figure 3: Appointment, termination and length of service, High Court of Australia 
 
Source: Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), Oxford Companion to the High Court of 
Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001); ConnectWeb, Who’s Who in Australia (Crown Content, 2013); High 
Court of Australia www.hcourt.gov.au/. 
C. Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1994–2013 
Since the Constitutional Court was established in 1994, 23 judges have been appointed to it 
(as at 30 June 2013), of whom 10 are incumbent and the remaining 13 have ceased to hold 
office.82 The average age of appointees is 54.4 years, with the youngest being appointed at 
36.8 years and the oldest at 64.0 years. Figure 4 plots the mean age at appointment using the 
same methodology as above,83 and reveals remarkable stability in this variable over the past 
decade. Figure 4 also plots the mean age at termination (left hand axis) and the mean length 
of service (right hand axis) of the 13 justices and chief justices whose appointments have 
now terminated. Although caution is needed in interpreting the data because of the small 
population size, the graph shows that the mean age at termination was steady at around 
70 years in the Court’s early years but has declined since 2008 to its current level of 
61.1 years. Conversely, the mean length of service rose steadily in the early years from 
7.3 years in 2004 and has plateaued at just under 15 years since 2009. In fact, all judges who 
departed the Court during its first decade served relatively short terms—less than 10 years—
whereas those who have departed since then have served close to their maximum term of 15 
years. This reflects the fact that appointees in the Court’s establishment phase were a highly 
                                                 
82 The Constitution also makes provision in s 175(1) for acting judges to be appointed to the Court if there 
is a vacancy or if a judge is absent. The Court’s website records 16 such appointments since 1995 but 
these are not included in the analysis. 
83 The means are calculated as a moving average of the past five appointments or terminations, commencing 
when the fifth event first occurred (1994 for appointments; 2004 for terminations). The means are based 
on five observations due to the small number of appointments to the Court since its inception. 
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diverse group of individuals who were on average older at appointment than their successors, 
and thus met the age limit of 70 years when their length of service was relatively short. 
Figure 4: Appointment, termination and length of service, Constitutional Court of South 
Africa 
 
Source: Constitutional Court of South Africa <www.constitutionalcourt.org.za>; Rapule Tabane and Barbara 
Ludman (eds), The Mail & Guardian A-Z of South African Politics (Jacana Media, 2009). 
D. Comparative Assessment 
What does the empirical record reveal about life limits, age limits and term limits in the three 
courts? Table 1 summarises key data, while Figure 5 re-presents the time series data in a way 
that aids visual comparison between the courts, focussing on the period since 1970. In 
interpreting the data it must be borne in mind that there have been intervening changes to the 
constitutional and legislative landscape with respect to tenure in each jurisdiction. In the 
United States, in 1984, judicial pensions were made available to federal judges at a younger 
age (see Part 5(A) below); in Australia, in 1977, an age limit of 70 years was introduced in 
lieu of life tenure; and in South Africa the term limit for judges of the Constitutional Court 
was increased from seven years (1993) to 12 years (1996) to 15 years in some cases (2001), 
subject to specific age limits. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: United States, Australia and South Africa 
 United States Australia South Africa 
 Supreme Court High Court Constitutional Court 
Period 1789–2013 1901–2013 1994–2013 
Membership 9 7 11 
Appointment    
     Youngest 32 yrs 36.6 yrs 36.8 yrs 
     Oldest 65 yrs 61.8 yrs 64.0 yrs 
     Mean age 52.5 yrs 54.1 yrs 54.4 yrs 
     Number 112 50 23 
Termination    
     Youngest 47 yrs 46.3 yrs 52.1 yrs 
     Oldest 90 yrs 87.0 yrs 74.4 yrs 
     Mean Age 69.6 yrs 69.4 yrs 66.5 yrs 
     Number 103 43 13 
Length of Service    
     Shortest 1 yr 0.1 yrs 4.0 yrs 
     Longest 37 yrs 45.7 yrs 15.3 yrs 
     Mean duration 17.0 yrs 15.9 yrs 11.5 yrs 
     Number (completed service) 103 43 13 
Source: As for Figures 2, 3, 4. 
The first point of comparison is that there is marked similarity in the mean age at appointment, 
and in the age range of appointments, to the three courts (Table 1, Figure 5A). For 
appointments made in the period 1970–2013, the mean age is 53.1 (United States), 54.9 
(Australia) and 54.4 years (South Africa). There has also been considerable stability in the 
age at appointment over time, except in Australia, where the mean age has risen since 1995 
from early-fifties to late-fifties. 
In contrast, there are significant disparities in the mean age at termination (Figure 5B). The 
Supreme Court and the High Court had similar experience in the period 1970–1985, when 
the mean age at termination hovered at around 70 years. For the High Court, the mean age at 
termination then declined in the period 1985–2010. This was not due to the introduction of 
mandatory retirement but to idiosyncratic factors affecting individual retirees, such as ill 
health and appointment to other offices. The mean age has since edged back towards 70 years 
because the past six terminations have all occurred at the mandatory retirement age. In the 
Supreme Court, however, there has been a relentless rise in the mean age at termination, 
which is now over 80 years—a full 11.5 years greater than the High Court. There is no ceiling 
to that rise other than the limits of human longevity itself. Interestingly, the rise in tenure has 
closely tracked improvements in longevity—between 1970 and 2010 the mean age at 
termination on the Supreme Court rose by 19 per cent, while life expectancy at age 50 (both 
sexes, all races) rose by 21.7 per cent. 84  In the Constitutional Court the mean age at 
termination was initially around 70 years (2004–2009) but has since fallen sharply to 61.0 
years. 
                                                 
84 University of California and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 'Human Mortality Database: 
United States of America Life Tables (1x1)' (2013)   <www.mortality.org>. Life expectancy at age 50 was 
25.98 years in 1970 and 31.63 years in 2010. 
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The patterns in mean length of service reflect the combined effect of changes in the mean 
age at appointment and the mean age at termination, as shown in Figure 5C. In the Supreme 
Court, the mean length of service has been 25 years or more every year since 1993. In the 
High Court, length of service has rarely exceeded 15 years over the same period, so that over 
the past 20 years (1994–2013) Supreme Court tenure has exceeded High Court tenure by an 
average of 11.3 years. In the High Court, the mean length of service has edged downwards 
in recent years because the mean age at appointment has risen while facing a fixed age limit 
of 70 years. In the Constitutional Court, the mean length of service has risen to just under 15 
years, reflecting the rising term limits for some judges discussed above. 
 
23 




Source: As for Figures 2, 3, 4. 
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5. Circumventing Constitutional Constraints 
One of the functions of a written constitution is to be ‘an anchor in the past’, creating rules 
that bind ‘until a supermajority of the living changes them’.85 This purposeful rigidity can 
create problems when the social facts upon which the rules were built cease to hold true. In 
the jurisdictions under examination, accommodations have been made to address these 
constitutional rigidities. In the United States, judges with life tenure have been encouraged 
to exit through generous retirement arrangements. In Australia, judges who have been forced 
to exit due to mandatory retirement have been encouraged to return as acting judges with 
short-term tenure. In South Africa, judges have been authorised to tarry longer through the 
extension of their term limits and age limits. In some cases, the desired flexibility has been 
achieved by overlaying constitutional rules with legislative provisions; in others, change has 
been made to the constitution itself. This Part examines creative solutions to some of the 
drawbacks of existing models of tenure. 
A. Encouraging Exit: Incentives for Retirement in the United States 
The drafters of the United States Constitution believed that life tenure was an appropriate 
model for the federal judiciary because the prospect of a ‘superannuated bench’ was an 
‘imaginary danger’.86 Today, the empirical record reveals legitimate grounds for concern, at 
least at the level of the highest federal court. Not only are Supreme Court justices departing 
at historically extreme ages but some are outliving their ‘season of intellectual vigor’ long 
before departure. 
Yet these concerns are not new. A century after the life tenure model was adopted, Congress 
was alive to these issues and adopted two complementary measures to address them. In 1869 
legislation was enacted to discourage federal judges from ‘remaining in office despite mental 
or physical infirmity’87 by providing financial incentives for voluntary departure before death. 
A judge who had attained 70 years of age and completed 10 years’ judicial service could 
retire from office and receive a pension for life, equivalent to the judge’s salary at resignation. 
The heir of that provision remains on the statute books, although the qualifying conditions 
have changed. Since 1984, 28 USC §371(a) has stipulated the ‘Rule of Eighty’:88 any federal 
judge aged 65 or more may retire from office on a lifetime pension if the sum of his or her 
age and years of service is at least 80—for example, age 65 with 15 years’ service, age 66 
with 14 years’ service and so on. 
Fifty years later a second reform was implemented, providing ‘a method of inducing 
retirement in a system in which mandatory retirement is unavailable’.89 Since 1919 most 
federal judges have been able to take a form of qualified retirement—called senior service—
in which they can work part-time and continue to receive a full judicial salary. The legislation 
initially excluded Supreme Court justices, but in 1937 they were brought within the senior 
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service arrangements. As with the 1869 retirement provisions, senior service was initially 
available to judges who had attained 70 years of age and completed 10 years’ service. Today, 
28 USC §371(b) allows a federal judge to ‘retire from regular active service’ if the Rule of 
Eighty conditions are met, so long as the judge performs a minimum of three months’ work 
a year. Senior service has become an increasingly attractive alternative to full retirement, for 
a mixture of personal and altruistic reasons.90 Senior status judges continue to enjoy the 
stimulation of judicial work (or equivalent non-judicial work) with greater control over their 
caseload; they draw a full judicial pension that attracts significant tax concessions; and they 
retain their offices and staff; but they also create a vacancy on the court which can alleviate 
workload pressure for fellow judges. 
Nevertheless, the changes in patterns of termination brought about by the senior service 
legislation have not been radical. In a study of departures from the United States Court of 
Appeals between 1919 and 1954, Richard Vining found that introducing qualified retirement 
did not make judges rush to leave the Court after their pensions vested (then at age 70); but 
it did make them ‘more willing to amble toward the exits’.91 For the Supreme Court, the 
impact of these changes appears to have been significantly weaker, as borne out by the rising 
mean age at termination since 1985. For that Court, legislative attempts to discourage 
excessive service on the bench appear to have failed, leading one to ponder other solutions. 
B. Encouraging Return: Post-Retirement Service in Australia 
Australian courts face the contrary problem—how to retain the service of judges who have 
been forced to retire prematurely. As already noted, federal judges must retire at 70 and no 
person can be appointed as a federal judge if he or she has already attained that age.92 Judicial 
service of any kind is thus impossible beyond age 70 within the federal judicial system. 
However, several Australian States recognise that their own mandatory retirement laws 
(which are not constrained by federal constitutional provisions) deprive their courts of fine 
talent, and they have enacted schemes to ameliorate the consequences of forced departure by 
appointing acting judges. In this way, retired judges of federal and state courts may return to 
render judicial service in their mature years within the state court systems, just as they have 
been used in executive roles such as conducting inquiries and royal commissions. 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales provides a salient example of this practice. Judges 
of this Court face compulsory retirement at age 72,93 but a qualified person may be appointed 
as an acting judge of the Court beyond that age for a period not exceeding 12 months—for 
example, to fill a temporary judicial absence or ameliorate a court backlog.94 The problem of 
mental decrepitude is dealt with by the short term nature of acting appointments and by 
setting additional age limits—age 75 or 77, depending on the circumstances. The problem of 
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preserving judicial independence is addressed in part by the fixed term nature of the 
appointment; by the constitutional prohibition on removing an acting judge during the fixed 
term other than for proved misbehaviour or incapacity; 95  and by the setting of their 
remuneration by an independent tribunal. Yet, the ‘fragile bastion’96 of judicial independence 
is not fully protected by these arrangements—there is no restriction on re-appointment, which 
opens the door to executive preferment, and there is no restriction on acting judges holding 
other offices or employment. 
Although acting judges in the New South Wales Supreme Court are not required by law to 
be retired judges, the facility is widely used in this way. The Supreme Court’s 2012 annual 
report lists nine persons who held office as acting judges during that year, compared with 48 
permanent judges.97 Together, the acting judges contributed 816 days of judicial service to 
the Supreme Court in 2012. While one may question whether the regulatory regime 
sufficiently safeguards judicial independence, there is little doubt that it is well-utilised by 
the executive as a flexible tool for returning mandatory retirees to the bench. Yet it does so 
at some cost: acting judges are remunerated at a daily rate in addition to any pension they are 
entitled to receive as retired judges. 
C. Tarrying Longer: Extending Service in South Africa 
A third strategy for addressing problems of judicial tenure has been to relax the limitations 
inherent in the constitutional rules. This is evident in South Africa, where the original term 
limit of seven years for judges of the Constitutional Court was seen as too short, and in 
Australia, where the age limit of 70 years is now regarded by many as too young.98 
The experience of the Constitutional Court has been set out above. The 1993 interim 
Constitution imposed a non-renewable term limit of seven years, which was increased in 
1996 to 12 years under the final Constitution, and then made subject to further extension by 
legislation in 2001, as a result of which the maximum term now stands at 15 years in some 
circumstances. These changes reflect the growing confidence of the parliament, the executive 
and the public in an experimental institution that was, in its early years, fiercely independent 
yet politically astute in charting a new course in democratic constitutionalism.99 
The tenure provision in s 176 of the South African Constitution has remained the subject of 
active debate, although it has not been altered again. In 2010, a draft constitutional 
amendment bill proposed that s 176 be amended to create a unified system of tenure for 
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judges of superior courts in South Africa—the revival of a proposal that was made in 2001.100 
This proposal abandoned the idea of a non-renewable constitutional term of 12 years, 
providing instead that a Constitutional Court judge ‘holds office until he or she attains the 
age of 70 or until he or she is discharged from active service in terms of an Act of 
Parliament’.101 However, the Act that passed through Parliament and is now in force did not 
contain this provision.102 
6. Balancing Conflicting Values 
The preceding discussion has shown that there are complex policy choices at stake in crafting 
arrangements for judicial tenure in modern constitutional democracies. This Part examines 
some of the central tensions in five dyadic relationships. 
A. Independence and Accountability 
A A Paterson pithily summarised the conflicting values in this area when discussing United 
Kingdom legislation that allows the Lord Chancellor to declare a judge’s office vacant if a 
judge becomes permanently infirm and is incapacitated from resigning: 
‘On the one hand there is belief that in a democracy the rights of the citizens are best 
protected by some form of separation of powers and by the independence of the 
judiciary from external pressures or controls. On the other hand there is the 
democratic notion that public officials who are entrusted with power should be held 
accountable to the nation, and must be fit persons to exercise these powers.’103 
Life limits, age limits and terms limits are different solutions to the problem of executive 
interference in the exercise of judicial functions, such as the English experienced during the 
reign of the Stuart Kings. Although external interference is not the only threat to be guarded 
against, this type of decisional independence has become a value of the highest order in 
assessing models of tenure. Life tenure provides the greatest bulwark against executive 
interference but the other models do not seriously compromise that goal so long as the age 
limit is not too young nor the term limit too short (requiring departing judges to seek post-
judicial employment). In the case of term limits, it is also important that judicial terms are 
non-renewable so that judges have nothing to gain or lose by deciding cases for or against 
the government of the day. 
Judges are very much alive to potential threats to their independence, as can be seen in the 
Justice Alliance Case, which concerned the tenure of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court.104 The case ruled on the validity of s 8(a) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions 
of Employment Act 2001 (South Africa), which provided that a Chief Justice who becomes 
eligible for discharge from active service may, at the request of the President of the Republic, 
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continue to perform active service until 75 years of age. The section thus allowed the term of 
a Chief Justice (but no other judge) to be extended at the discretion of the executive. Thus it 
was that, in April 2011, President Zuma wrote to Chief Justice Ngcobo to request that he 
remain in office for an additional five years to provide leadership to the judicial branch during 
a period of critical transformation. The Chief Justice, who was then 58 years of age and had 
completed 11.8 years of service on the Court, acceded to the request but the events quickly 
led to a constitutional challenge. A unanimous Constitutional Court (absent the Chief Justice) 
struck down s 8(a). The Court held that s 176 of the Constitution gives the power to extend 
the terms of Constitutional Court judges to the Parliament, but that s 8(a) was an unlawful 
attempt to usurp that power by delegation to the executive. Such a delegation was 
impermissible because ‘non-renewability is the bedrock of security of tenure and a dyke 
against judicial favour in passing judgment’.105 Moreover, the Act was invalid in so far as it 
sought to single out the Chief Justice from other judges of the Court in conferring a benefit 
by extending the term of office.106 In the result, the Chief Justice withdrew his consent to 
serve for an additional period and ceased to hold office on the expiration of his 12-year term. 
Weighed against the demands of judicial independence is the need for judicial accountability. 
The problem was posed during the United States ratification debates when Robert Yates, 
writing as Brutus in the Anti-Federalist Papers, proffered the vatic observation that life 
tenure would make judges ‘soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself’.107 In the 
present context, the problem is at its starkest when a life tenure judge is incapable of 
discharging his or her duties by reason of mental decrepitude but nonetheless refuses to retire. 
The usual mechanisms of judicial accountability—conduct of proceedings in open court, 
delivery of reasons for judgment, and appellate review—would ordinarily expose such judges 
to adverse public scrutiny and might nudge them towards retirement. It has been suggested 
that the declining productivity of elderly judges has been masked in the United States in 
recent years by the increasing delegation of opinion writing to law clerks, which has allowed 
‘a small number of senile judges’ and a larger number of senescent judges to continue in 
office well past their prime.108 However, judicial ‘ghost-writing’ is not generally practised in 
Australia, or it seems South Africa, where judges write their own judgments. 
B. Constancy and Change: The Composition of the Bench 
A second tension in the models of judicial tenure is the balance between constancy and 
change in the composition of the bench. Joseph Raz has argued that stability is an important 
principle underpinning the rule of law because it allows people to know the law for the 
purpose of short-term decision making and long-term planning;109 or, as C L Ten expresses 
it, laws should not be changed too frequently because otherwise they are ‘difficult to comply 
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with and thereby fail to direct people’s conduct’.110 While this derives from a ‘thin’ or 
‘formal’ version of the rule of law which does not address the characteristics of a good system 
of laws or government, it is widely accepted as a minimum content of the rule of law.111 It is 
a short step to conclude that stability in the composition of a court promotes stability in its 
jurisprudence, especially in appellate courts that have a clear law-making function. This is 
not to say that long-serving judges do not change their opinions over time, but seismic shifts 
in legal principles are less likely when the personnel interpreting and developing them are 
not subject to frequent change. 
Pitted against the need for stability on the bench is the need for change to ensure that evolving 
social values are broadly reflected in decisions of the courts, especially when judges are 
called on to interpret and apply Bills of Rights. As a former High Court justice observed, the 
rules relating to tenure should provide for ‘regular and seemly exits’ so that the final court 
can be ‘dynamic and open-minded’. 112  The argument is not that judges should be a 
simulacrum of the people on whose behalf they interpret and apply the law but that frequent 
turnover ensures that judges are not too far out of kilter with the ethos of the community they 
serve. For courts at the highest level, the policy preferences of judges should be refreshed 
regularly for reasons of good governance and democratic legitimacy. 
There is an important linkage between the model of tenure and diversity of the bench because 
tenure directly impacts the rate of judicial turnover. In the United Kingdom it has been 
observed that the pace of change in the judiciary has generally been slow because there is a 
limited number of judicial positions held until retirement, and entry into the profession can 
only be achieved incrementally, following the retirement of sitting judges.113 For this reason 
a House of Lords Select Committee recommended differential retirement ages for judges at 
different levels of the hierarchy. This would promote diversity by ensuring that posts become 
available at the lower levels while leaving time for talented individuals who have not 
followed a traditional career path to reach the highest levels.114 A short term of office can 
promote diversity on the bench by providing the executive with an opportunity to make fresh 
appointments that reflect the composition of society (e.g. by race or gender, as the South 
African Constitution requires).115 Yet gains in diversity that are quickly won can also be 
easily lost, which was a potential danger when five new judges were appointed to the 
Constitutional Court in a single year in 2009.116 
The goal of stability favours life limits or reasonably long term limits but in principle it says 
nothing about age limits because the length of service depends on the age at appointment. 
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However, given the observed fact that the judges examined here are generally appointed in 
their early fifties, stability can also be achieved by age limits that are not too young. In 
contrast, the goals of change and renewal are best served by shorter term limits and younger 
age limits, and are the antithesis of life tenure which permits the development of a geriatric 
bench. Subject to the limitations of the South African data, these generalisations are 
supported by the statistics presented in Part 3, which show that the mean length of service on 
the Supreme Court has been 25 years or more for the past 20 years, while judges on the High 
Court and Constitutional Court have served for a decade less. 
C. Cost and Effectiveness 
A third but often unarticulated tension exists between the economic cost of different models 
of tenure and their effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the judicial system. The 
tension is encapsulated in the pressure faced by all modern judicial systems to produce 
outcomes that are just and cost-effective. The issue of effectiveness has been canvassed 
above—the critical question is whether the tenure model, which affects the age of judges and 
their length of service, adversely impacts on the adjudicatory process. It could do so if aged 
or long-serving judges are less able to resolve disputes in a timely manner, or produce 
decisions of lower quality, or are more prone to error. The latter situation imposes burdens 
on the parties and the legal system through the instigation of avoidable appeals (if they are 
available) or the failure to resolve disputes according to law, with a consequent erosion of 
the rule of law. 
It is the economic cost of different tenure models that has gone most unremarked. The 
appointment of judges imposes direct costs to public finance through salaries, pensions, 
personal staff and facilities, and these costs vary from model to model. A lack of transparency 
sometimes arises because legislatures tend to bias the compensation of judges towards non-
salary benefits such as pensions, which are harder to value and less likely to provoke public 
discontent.117 
The balance between cost and effectiveness is illustrated by the remuneration of federal 
judges in Australia. During their years of active service, judges are paid a salary set by an 
independent tribunal. Once they have reached 60 years of age and completed 10 years’ 
service, they are entitled to an annual lifetime pension calculated at 60 per cent of the current 
salary of an equivalent judge. After their death, the judge’s spouse is then entitled to an annual 
lifetime pension calculated at 62.5 per cent of the judicial pension. The combined value of 
these pensions depends on the longevity of the judge and the spouse, but for a male judge 
who retires as soon as his pension vests—i.e. at 60 years after 10 years’ service, which is a 
reasonably common occurrence in federal courts other than the High Court—the expected 
real value of the pension component is 2.6 times larger than the total salary paid to the judge 
over his 10 years of service.118 
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Different tenure arrangements create complex trade-offs between different components of 
cost on the one hand (e.g. salary versus pensions), and between economic cost and 
effectiveness on the other. Increasing the age limit or re-introducing life tenure would 
encourage Australian judges to retire later than the current mandatory retirement laws require. 
Every extra year of judicial service requires the state to pay more in salary than it saves in 
pension (because the pension is 60 per cent of salary), but the marginal cost of that option is 
less than the cost of appointing a new judge to provide equivalent labour, since a new 
appointee generates no pension saving. On the other hand, each extra year of service 
increases the likelihood of falling productivity or rising decrepitude, which impacts on an 
ageing judge’s effectiveness. Although the trade-offs are unique to the retirement and 
remuneration arrangements in each jurisdiction, the general principle is well understood by 
executive government: longer serving judges save direct public expenditure but at the risk of 
diminishing effectiveness. 
D. Rigidity and Flexibility: The Level of Regulation 
A fourth tension is the respective roles of the constitution and legislation in regulating judicial 
tenure. Comparative practice suggests that constitutions need not contain every provision that 
affects judicial tenure but nor should they remain silent. The quest is to find an appropriate 
balance between rigidity and flexibility, since constitutions are purposefully difficult to 
amend, while legislation is subject to the transitory will of the majority of elected 
representatives. The tipping point will depend, among other things, on the ease with which 
the constitution can be amended in theory and practice. 
The rules most suitable for constitutional inclusion are those that go to foundational 
architecture (such as the choice between alternative models of tenure) and those that seek to 
protect the judiciary from legislative or executive encroachment. Within a socially acceptable 
range, finer details can be left to statute-makers. For example, if term limits are the chosen 
architecture, the constitution should specify that terms are non-renewable, and stipulate a 
minimum term or a span of years within which the legislature may make choices. If age limits 
are the chosen architecture, the constitution should specify a minimum age for appointment 
and a maximum age for retirement, subject to legislative extension. In either case, the 
constitution should articulate enduring principles that protect judicial independence. These 
include the principles that the legislature cannot alter (or at a minimum, cannot reduce) the 
term of a judge who has already been appointed, and that age limits and term limits should 
apply to all judges of a particular class and not be individuated. 
The Australian and South African experience show that constitutions falter when they over-
specify and thus entrench policy choices that are impervious to changing social 
circumstances. When the age limit for federal judges was adopted in Australia in 1977, male 
life expectancy at birth was 69.8 years; almost identical to the age limit of 70 years. By 2009, 
when the Senate recommended increasing the age limit to 72 or 75 years, male life 
expectancy had risen to 79.5 years; 14 per cent higher than the mandatory retirement age. 
How relevant will the constitution be in 2061, when male life expectancy is projected to reach 
92.1 years; 32 per cent higher than the current age limit? 
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E. The High and the Low: Differentiating between Courts 
A final tension is whether the same tenure model should apply to all courts within a country 
or whether justifiable distinctions can be drawn between courts based on their position in the 
court hierarchy or the subject matter of their jurisdiction. This article has focussed on judicial 
tenure in three pre-eminent appellate courts but tenure arrangements are not uniform within 
those countries. Consider South Africa. For judges of the Constitutional Court, the 
Constitution currently stipulates a hybrid model comprising term limits (12 years) and age 
limits (70 years) subject to legislative extension; yet for judges of other courts, the 
Constitution leaves both the choice of model and its details entirely to the legislature.119 In 
fact, the Parliament has chosen to impose an age limit (70 years) for non-Constitutional Court 
judges, although that limit is relaxed if a judge would reach 70 before serving for 10 years.120 
One justification for differentiated approaches relates to subject matter. In Australia there 
was a period (1977–1991) in which judges of the Family Court faced a mandatory retirement 
age of 65 years although the age limit for other federal judges was 70.121 The difference was 
explained by the ‘demanding and arduous nature’ of custody disputes and the need for judges 
in this field to ‘keep abreast of current social values and attitudes’.122  Ultimately these 
considerations yielded to another concern, namely, the desire to improve the status of the 
Family Court in the eyes of the public by giving its judges the same tenure as other federal 
judges, and parity was duly restored. 
A second justification for differentiation relates to the political function of the court in 
question. The most delicate tensions between the branches of government often fall to be 
decided in an apex court or constitutional court. Although it has been said that it is invidious 
if judges of those courts are treated less favourably than judges below them in relation to 
tenure,123 the politically charged questions they adjudicate may call for unique measures. In 
the United States, these considerations led Calabresi and Lindgren to propose that the life 
tenure of Supreme Court justices—but not other federal judges—be replaced by a non-
renewable 18-year term, staggered in such a way that each President would be able to 
nominate two justices during a four-year presidential term.124 This would assist in giving 
every President an equal and regular influence on the makeup of the Court (subject to 
unscheduled departures), and thus make the Court more democratically accountable through 
systematic turnover of its membership. 
A third justification relates to the level of the judicial officer within the court hierarchy. In 
several Australian states, magistrates face younger mandatory retirement than judges 
appointed to courts above them—typically 65 years compared to 70 years.125 Pragmatic 
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reasons for the difference include younger appointment to the magistracy, and heavy daily 
caseloads that might be thought too onerous for ageing judicial officers; but there are also 
reasons of principle. In Van Rooyen, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that lower 
courts are not entitled to have their independence protected in the same way as higher courts, 
notwithstanding they are required to function independently and impartially. Judicial 
independence can be achieved in a variety of ways, and it is permissible to pay regard to the 
variety of courts that exist within the judicial system.126 One relevant difference is that lower 
courts have higher courts to protect them, suggesting that the protection of tenure should 
escalate as one ascends the court hierarchy. 
In the United Kingdom, these factors were recently canvassed in a House of Lords Select 
Committee report on judicial appointments, which also discussed the issue of retirement age. 
The Committee concluded that different considerations applied to senior appellate courts 
than to lower level courts, justifying mandatory retirement at age 75 for the former but age 70 
for the latter.127  It was said that different retirement ages would promote diversity and 
maintain public confidence in the judiciary because it would ‘ensure the retention to age 75 
of judges at the highest level, where proven judicial quality and experience are at a premium 
in the development of the law’ and ‘ensure that posts become available at the lower levels’. 
7. Conclusion 
If the competing values at stake in different models of judicial tenure were simple to reconcile 
it is reasonable to suppose that mature constitutional democracies might have arrived at a 
stable solution by now—even if that solution is not common to all legal systems because of 
the differing weights attached to competing considerations. Instead, the three countries show 
a flux in legal thinking, revealing dynamic tension between alternative models of tenure and 
between key parameters within the models. 
Examined over the long run, there has been dissatisfaction with judicial tenure arrangements 
in each country, prompting reform or proposals for reform. In the United States, this is 
reflected in the legislative palliatives relating to judicial pensions and senior status for life 
tenure judges, as well as in proposals made in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s to introduce 
mandatory retirement for federal judges128 and more recently to introduce fixed terms for the 
Supreme Court.129 In Australia, dissatisfaction is evident in the rejection of life tenure for 
federal judges in favour of age limits in the 1970s, coupled with experiments in lowering the 
retirement age and more recent proposals to increase it. In South Africa, dissatisfaction is 
apparent in the steps taken to increase the duration of term limits of the Constitutional Court 
and in the adoption of a hybrid model that combines term limits with age limits. 
It is unsurprising that life tenure—adopted with such confidence in the United States as an 
antidote to the English experience of royal caprice—should now be viewed with greater 
scepticism. Although life tenure provides the sturdiest protection against executive 
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interference, contemporary experience of increasing longevity and concomitant exposure to 
mental frailty in old age suggests that such an elevated degree of judicial independence comes 
at too high a cost. That cost has not been nullified by generous retirement provisions because 
judges (at least on the Supreme Court) have continued to serve well into old age despite 
legislative inducements to depart. 
On the other hand, it is hard to see how the independence of the judiciary is adversely affected 
by judges having to retire at a fixed age, or after a fixed period, if the parameters of those 
models are intelligently set. Whether the appropriate age limit is 70 or 75 years, or the term 
limit 10 or 15 years, is a matter of detailed policy about which polities may come to different 
conclusions, from each other and over time, depending on the social facts underpinning their 
political communities. As the Judicial Committee of the United States Senate observed many 
years ago, ‘the age at which retirement is compulsory is not nearly so important as the 
proposition that there be an age at which retirement is compulsory’.130 What is elementary is 
that the constitutional design preserves core features of judicial independence while giving 
flexibility to modify other features as changing circumstances require. 
In this context, South Africa’s hybrid model is an inventive solution that guards against some 
of the weaknesses of individual models of tenure and offers a potential template for other 
jurisdictions. The age limit controls for the risk of decrepitude among elderly judges, while 
the term limit ensures there are ‘regular and seemly exits’ that generate change and renewal 
on the court. Moreover, these objectives are achieved through a mixture of constitutional and 
legislative regulation, which provides rigidity in some dimensions and flexibility in others. 
However, the current arrangements have been in place for the Constitutional Court only since 
2001 and it is too early to make a full empirical assessment of their impact. In time, that 
assessment will need to take account of the economic incentives created by the parallel 
provisions regarding judicial pensions. 
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